

JOINT DOCTRINE CALENDAR 2000



NOVEMBER99



SUNDAY

MONDAY

TUESDAY

WEDNESDAY

THURSDAY

FRIDAY

SATURDAY

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

Veterans Day

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27


Thanksgiving Day

28

29

30

DECEMBER 99



SUNDAY

MONDAY

TUESDAY

WEDNESDAY

THURSDAY

FRIDAY

SATURDAY

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Christmas Day

26

27

28

29

30

31

JANUARY 2000



SUNDAY

MONDAY

TUESDAY

WEDNESDAY

THURSDAY

FRIDAY

SATURDAY

1

New Years Day

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Martin Luther
King Day

18

19

20

21

22

23/
30

24/
31

25

26

27

28

29

FEBRUARY 2000



SUNDAY

MONDAY

TUESDAY

WEDNESDAY

THURSDAY

FRIDAY

SATURDAY

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

Presidents Day

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

MARCH 2000



SUNDAY

MONDAY

TUESDAY

WEDNESDAY

THURSDAY

FRIDAY

SATURDAY

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

APRIL 2000



SUNDAY

MONDAY

TUESDAY

WEDNESDAY

THURSDAY

FRIDAY

SATURDAY

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

MAY 2000



SUNDAY

MONDAY

TUESDAY

WEDNESDAY

THURSDAY

FRIDAY

SATURDAY

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

Memorial Day
(Observed)

JUNE 2000



SUNDAY

MONDAY

TUESDAY

WEDNESDAY

THURSDAY

FRIDAY

SATURDAY

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

JULY 2000



SUNDAY

MONDAY

TUESDAY

WEDNESDAY

THURSDAY

FRIDAY

SATURDAY

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Independence Day

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23/
30

24/
31

25

26

27

28

29

AUGUST 2000



SUNDAY

MONDAY

TUESDAY

WEDNESDAY

THURSDAY

FRIDAY

SATURDAY

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

SEPTEMBER 2000



SUNDAY

MONDAY

TUESDAY

WEDNESDAY

THURSDAY

FRIDAY

SATURDAY

1

2

3

4

Labor Day

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

OCTOBER 2000



SUNDAY

MONDAY

TUESDAY

WEDNESDAY

THURSDAY

FRIDAY

SATURDAY

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Columbus Day
(Observed)

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

NOVEMBER 2000



SUNDAY

MONDAY

TUESDAY

WEDNESDAY

THURSDAY

FRIDAY

SATURDAY

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Election Day

Veterans Day

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Thanksgiving

26

27

28

29

30

DECEMBER 2000



SUNDAY

MONDAY

TUESDAY

WEDNESDAY

THURSDAY

FRIDAY

SATURDAY

| | | | | | | |
|-----------|---------------------|----|----|----|----|----|
| | | | | | 1 | 2 |
| 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 |
| 24/ 31 | 25 Christmas Day | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 |

DOCTRINE 2000 CALENDAR

Questions & Comments

If you have any questions regarding this calendar or wish to submit an event to be added to this calendar, please email us at doctrine@netcom.com

JOINT PUBLICATION 1

UNRESOLVED CRITICAL AND MAJOR COMMENTS ON SECOND DRAFT

| Agency | Type | Page # | Line # | Comment |
|--------|------|--------|---------|---|
| USAF | M | 0.14 | 136.138 | <p>Change to read: “. . . to fight and win in <u>near-simultaneous</u>, large-scale, sustained combat abroad. In addition, simultaneous occurrences of challenges and threats to US interests worldwide. . . “</p> <p>RATIONALE: It appears JP 1 has backed off entirely on the discussion of near simultaneity in MTWs as a fundamental element of military planning. Adding “near-simultaneous” to the large scale conflict discussion addresses this. Delete simultaneous from the following sentence concerning SSCs to avoid repetition and because the sentence discusses “concurrent commitment” to SSCs which implies simultaneity.</p> |
| J5 | C | 0.14 | 143.146 | <p>Preface, xiv, lines 143, 146. And IV-12, line 267; IV-13, lines 273-8; IV-14, lines 288-95.</p> <p>Replace “forward presence” with “overseas presence”; delete reference to “forcible entry.”</p> <p><u>Rationale:</u> The concepts used in this paragraph are from the National Military Strategy and should remain consistent with that document. JP1 is not a strategy document, and therefore, it is not the proper forum to promulgate changes to this list. Additionally, “forcible entry” is an operational capability, not a strategic concept.</p> |
| USN | M | 1.16 | 301.303 | <p>Change as follows: “Nevertheless, doctrine does not replace or alter a commander's obligation <u>authority and responsibility</u> to determine the proper course of action under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision.”</p> <p>REASON: The concepts of command authority and responsibility are well defined and universally understood. They are preferable to the less forceful word “obligation.”</p> |
| J5 | M | 2.05 | 85 | <p>Delete “high-power conventional explosives.” (resubmission)</p> <p><u>Rationale:</u> Not consistent with WMD definition in JP 1-02.</p> |
| USA | M | 3.14 | 321 | <p>Recommend adding definition of terms (fundamentals) before stating application.</p> <p>Rationale: In most cases, the fundamentals are discussed in their application without any discussion of what they mean in a joint military context.</p> |
| USN | M | 3.23 | 516.517 | <p>Change as follows: “Those characteristics, and capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.”</p> <p>REASON: A “location,” regardless of its significance, cannot be considered a center of gravity for either side in a conflict. In itself, and without a source of physical or other strength, a geographic location means little or nothing.</p> |
| EUCOM | M | 3.25 | 557 | <p>figure III-5 needs to portray the spectrum of military actions that span operations. Operations in any environment require forces to conduct or be prepared to conduct any combinations of the following actions (see attached slide).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offensive actions to destroy or defeat the enemy. • Defensive actions to deny or defeat the enemies attack; delay; economize forces; and develop conditions favorable for offensive action. • Stability actions to influence civil, military, and political environments to facilitate diplomacy and/or to disrupt illegal activities. • Support actions to provide essential supplies and services to assist designated groups or civil authorities at home and abroad. <p>Rationale: Commanders at all echelons may combine different types of ODSS actions simultaneously to accomplish operations in</p> |

| | | | | |
|-------|---|------|---------|---|
| | | | | war and MOOTW. For example, the JTF and Army component commanders may determine the emphasis Army forces place on each type of operation. |
| EUCOM | C | 4.06 | 133.184 | <p>Pages IV-6 to IV-12. This section is poorly organized, lacks critical information, and reflects a profound retreat from the current coda of the Shape, Respond, and Prepare architecture that forms the foundation of the guidance found in the NMS.</p> <p>The section is currently divided into two sections:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Influencing the International Security Environment and b. Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future <p>Recommend dividing the section into three subsections as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Shaping the International Security Environment (Page IV-6) b. Responding to the Full Spectrum of Military Operations (Page IV -8) c. Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future (Page IV-12) <p>Rationale: Allows section to remain consistent with the NMS and moves the discussion on Response to an appropriate sub-section from the current sub-section of “Influencing the International Security Environment.”</p> <p>The words Shape and Respond have both been deleted from the passages (lines 133 and 184). In addition, the concept of engagement has been deleted with the exception of the vignette offered on page IV-8. The changes contained in this draft conflict with the current NSS/NMS. Some specifics are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Page IV-6, line 133: The word Shape has been replaced with Influence. This appears to retreat from the current approach of our engagement program. Shaping is a more exact term than influence which describes our efforts to positively affect the security environment to meet established objectives and protect and promote U.S. interests. Change text back to “Shaping the International Security Environment.” (2) Page IV-8, line 184: Retain the word “Respond”. <p>Rationale: Corresponds with current national level guidance.</p> <p>Finally, after the above changes are incorporated in the document, section “a” on “Shaping the International Security Environment” remains poorly structured. Shaping the security environment is accomplished using two major tools: Engagement activities and deterrence. The objectives of Shaping are to “Promote Peace and Stability” and “Preventing or Reducing Conflicts and Threats.” The current section discusses these two objectives and deterrence, but fails to mention engagement. Engagement activities; including mil-to-mil contact, exercises, training, education, arms control, and the Security Assistance and Humanitarian Assistance Programs; are the underpinning of a Combatant Commands ability to shape the security environment, play a major role in meeting the Command’s objectives, require an enormous amount of resources (PfP, Joint Contact Team, Marshall Center, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, African Crises Response Initiative, NATO exercises, SAOs etc), and are a major contributor to current Ops-Tempo problems. As such, the importance of engagement cannot be overstated. Recommend restructuring the paragraph to indicate that Engagement and Deterrence are the tools (ways) and that Promoting Peace and Preventing Conflicts are the objective (ends). Recommend that the following paragraph be added to provide the necessary information on Engagement:</p> <p>“Peacetime engagement activities include mil-to-mil contacts, training, education, exercises, arms control initiatives, security assistance, and humanitarian assistance. These activities help deter aggression, promote regional stability, and build effective coalitions. These activities also provide an effective means by which to positively shape the international security environment and to meet regional U.S. objectives. However, engagement activities must be carefully managed and appropriately prioritized in order to prevent erosion of the military’s current and long-term readiness.”</p> |
| USA | M | 4.06 | 133.184 | <p>The section on joint doctrine’s relationship to the NMS (pages IV-6 to IV-8) appears to differ from the current Shape, Respond, and Prepare. The words Shape and Respond have both been deleted from the passages (lines 133 and 184). In addition, the concept of engagement has been deleted with the exception of the vignette offered on page IV-8. Our concern is that the changes contained in this draft conflict with the current NSS/NMS (understanding that these might change). Some specifics are:</p> |

| | | | | |
|-------|---|------|---------|---|
| | | | | <p>(1) Page IV-6, line 133: The word Shape has been replaced with Influence. This appears to retreat from our current approach in our engagement program.</p> <p>(2) Page IV-8, line 184: Retain the word “Respond”. It corresponds with current strategy</p> |
| USAF | C | 4.10 | 215.216 | <p>Add the following after, “while the war is being prosecuted.”: <u>“For the foreseeable future, the United States, preferably in concert with allies, must have the capability to deter and, if necessary, defeat large-scale aggression in two distinct theaters in overlapping time frames. The ability to rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of the enemy’s objectives in two theaters ensures that we can seize the initiative, minimize territory lost before an invasion is halted and ensure the integrity of our warfighting coalitions.”</u></p> <p>RATIONALE: It appears JP 1 has backed off entirely on the discussion of near simultaneity in MTWs as a fundamental element of military planning. Ironically, the paragraph on SSCs immediately following the Major war discussion begins by emphasizing the challenges posed by simultaneous SSCs. The NSS, DPG, CPG, and NMS all address this bedrock planning principle. First sentence of proposed language taken from current NSS. Second sentence also from NSS but paraphrased. As a global power with vital interests in at least two theaters, is any CINC willing to accept no capability to rapidly halt cross-border aggressions in more than one theater?</p> |
| USN | C | 4.19 | 389.393 | <p>Change as follows:</p> <p>“Assured Access to the Battlespace. Forward presence and power projection are possible only if US military power <u>can attain</u> assured access to the area of envisioned employment. <u>Assured access is attainable by three means: use of international waters, securing international agreements with other states around the world, or conducting a forced entry at sea or land.</u> This places a requirement on the civilian and military agencies of the US government to have prudent peacetime agreements with other states around the world to facilitate US entry, prosecution, and conclusion of operations.”</p> <p>REASON: Assured access is more than basing rights. International waters by their very nature are open to all and provide Naval Forces access to much of the world. Traditional forcible entry to seize a port is fundamental to “assuring access.” More broadly the ability to force an ocean strait is fundamental to sea control and assuring access. Finally, basing rights for forward presence and power projection also facilitate access for land-based forces and naval logistics.</p> |
| USN | M | 5.07 | 129.130 | <p>Change as follows: “Those characteristics, and capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.”</p> <p>REASON: A “location,” regardless of its significance, cannot be considered a center of gravity for either side in a conflict. In itself, and without a source of physical or other strength, a geographic location means little or nothing.</p> |
| EUCOM | M | 7.14 | 282.283 | <p>Change the title of the section to “Legal Considerations” instead of “International Law”. Also change first sentence below this heading to read: “The United States adheres to <u>US domestic and</u> international law governing warfare.” Rationale: The new section title clarifies that the scope of the paragraph is not limited to international law since US domestic law also significantly impacts warfare. Referencing US domestic law clarifies the important fact that the US follows both US domestic and international law governing warfare. The corrected title and language fit perfectly with this entire section of the pub since the main paragraph title of the of the section (paragraph 4) is entitled “CONSIDERATIONS” and line 235 of paragraph 4 on page VII-12 specifically references “legal” as one of the considerations. (POC: HQ USAFE/JAI, Lt Col Ringgenberg, DSN (314) 480-6941)</p> |
| USAF | M | 7.14 | 282.293 | <p>(Chpt VII, 4b and 4c): change to read:</p> <p>b. International Law Legal Considerations. The United States adheres to US domestic and international law governing warfare. It also conforms <u>The United States supports international human rights and adheres to those international human rights</u> legal conventions and prescriptions <u>to which it is a party, or which express customary international law on</u> supporting human rights.</p> |

| | | | | |
|------|---|-------|-------|--|
| | | | | <p>c. Integration of International Organizations (IOs), NGOs, PVOs, and Contractors. Many host country governmental and civilian agencies, IOs, NGOs, PVOs, and civilian contractors routinely carry out activities to assist in nation development, ameliorate suffering, and support military forces in peace and war. As in the case of US interagency operations, combatant commanders must take account <u>be cognizant</u> of these operations and their actions; <u>to the extent that these organizations and operations support United States goals the combatant commander's civil affairs function should assure that their efforts and military efforts are integrated, complementary, or not in conflict; and establish coordination and mutual support mechanisms as needed.</u></p> <p>RATIONALE: For subparagraph b: There are human rights-type legal conventions to which the United States is not a party. The proposed language clarifies that the United States supports international human rights, and accurately states the legal relationship. For subparagraph c: Not all IOs, NGOs, PVOs and contractors may share the goals or beliefs of the United States. Some may actually be opposed to the goals and beliefs of the United States. Normally, a combatant commander's civil affairs officers will perform liaison with these organizations. Accordingly, the proposed language directs the combatant commander to be aware of all organizations, but to work only with those that support the United States.</p> |
| USA | M | 9.04 | 62 | <p>Recommend changing "Restrictions" to "Constraints".</p> <p>Rationale: The joint doctrine community uses the term "constraints" for this concept.</p> |
| USA | M | 9.07 | 112 | <p>Recommend adding "who" .</p> <p>Rationale: A completed course of action should include "who" as part of it.</p> |
| USAF | M | 10.01 | 8.9 | <p>Change to read. The objective of combat operations is the defeat of the enemy through destruction of the enemy armed forces' capabilities and or the enemy's will to fight. RATIONALE: Destruction of the enemy armed force capabilities may not be the military or political objective.</p> |
| USA | M | 10.03 | 48.49 | <p>Recommend changing as follows: "The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander. for every objective".</p> <p>Rationale: The key point is a single commander, one unified chain of command for each operation, not each objective. There may be several objectives in each operation.</p> |
| USA | M | 11.02 | 23 | <p>AM-11: Page C-2, line 23. Recommend rewording as follows: "Never permit <u>Hinder</u> hostile factions' <u>effort</u> ability to gain acquire a military, political or informational advantage.</p> <p>Rationale: Hindering the enemy effort is probably more realistic than never permitting.</p> |
| | | | | |